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ABSTRACT 
The prison-based N-ALIVE pilot trial had undertaken to notify the Research Ethics Committee and 
participants if we had reason to believe that the N-ALIVE pilot trial would not proceed to the main 
trial. In this paper, we describe how external data for the third year of before/after evaluation from 
Scotland’s National Naloxone Programme, a related public health policy, were anticipated by 
eliciting prior opinion about the Scottish results in the month prior to their release as official 
statistics. We summarise how deliberations by the N-ALIVE Trial Steering-Data Monitoring 
Committee (TS-DMC) on N-ALIVE’s own interim data, together with those on naloxone-on-release 
(NOR) from Scotland, led to the decision to cease randomization in the N-ALIVE pilot trial and  
recommend to local Principal Investigators that NOR be offered to already-randomized prisoners 
who had not yet been released. 
Keywords: Data Monitoring Committee; randomized pilot trial; external evidence; elicitation; 
causality; cessation. 
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1. Introduction 
Naloxone is an opioid antagonist used for emergency resuscitation following opioid overdose.  
Prisoners with a history of heroin use by injection have a high risk of drug-related death (DRDs) in 
the first weeks after release from prison1 2 3.  The N-ALIVE trial was planned as a large prison-based 
randomized controlled trial (RCT) to test the effectiveness of Naloxone-on-release (NOR) in the 
prevention of fatal opiate overdoses soon after release (30% reduction in the first 4-weeks; 20% in 
weeks 5-12)4.  The N-ALIVE pilot trial (ISRCTN34044390) was a randomized feasibility study to test 
the main trial’s assumptions on recruitment of prisons and prisoners, and also the logistics for 
ensuring that randomized participants received their N-ALIVE pack on release5. See Meade et al6 for 
how delivery of the N-ALIVE protocol was achieved in 16 prisons in England. See Parmar et al.5 for 
the feasibility outcomes in the N-ALIVE pilot trial. The N-ALIVE pilot trial had undertaken to notify 
the Research Ethics Committee and participants if we had reason to believe that the N-ALIVE pilot 
trial would not proceed to the N-ALIVE main trial. 
The start of Scotland’s National Naloxone Policy (NNP) in January 20117, with funding for both NOR 
and community-based take-home naloxone (THN), had pre-empted the N-ALIVE trial’s planned 
randomization in Scottish prisons. The primary outcome for Scotland’s science-led NNP-evaluation8 
was a 20% to 30% reduction in the proportion of opioid-related deaths (ORDs) with a 4-week 
antecedent of prison-release. As the proportion had been 10% in 2006-2010, Scotland’s NNP had 
80% power to discern reduction to 7% in 2011-13, as upper target; or to 8% in 2011-15, as lower 
target. 
In this paper, we describe how external data for the third year of before/after evaluation of 
Scotland’s NNP, a related public health policy7-10, were anticipated by eliciting prior opinion about 
the Scottish results in the month prior to their release as official statistics11 12. We then describe how 
deliberations by N-ALIVE’s Trial Steering-Data Monitoring Committee (TS-DMC) on N-ALIVE’s own 
interim data, together with those on NOR from Scotland, led to the decision to cease randomization 
in the N-ALIVE pilot trial and to recommend to local Principal Investigators (PIs) that NOR be offered 
to already-randomized prisoners who had not yet been released5. 
To be ready to act promptly, we had elicited expert opinion about the Scotland’s forthcoming 
results11 in order to focus on the most probable scenarios for TS-DMC’s decision-making. 
Unscheduled interim analysis was also undertaken of the N-ALIVE pilot trial’s own data from 
returned prisoner self-questionnaires, specifically on the extent of NOR’s administration 
intramuscularly to the ex-prisoner for whom it had been prescribed versus to another person. 
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We begin, therefore, with a brief history of formally eliciting prior opinion to inform the design and 
monitoring of RCTs funded by the UK’s Medical Research Council (MRC); and some early accounts of 
DMC deliberations. The back-story on the NALoxone InVEstigation (N-ALIVE) follows, which puts our 
elicitation in context, and sets the scene for deliberations and decisions by the N-ALIVE’s TS-DMC. 
 
2. On elicitations for randomized trials funded by the Medical Research Council and 
deliberations by Data Monitoring Committees 
The earliest example of formally eliciting prior opinion to inform trial design was “place your bets” 
about the mortality of surfactant-treated very premature babies (aged 25-29 weeks) in a RCT funded 
by MRC in the mid-1980s13 14. This “trial roulette” method was again used in the design and early 
stopping of the MRC’s neutron therapy trial in pelvic cancer15-18: the minority prior belief on the 
relative mortality of neutrons versus photons turned out to have been consistent with trial’s data. 
Following the early termination by the investigators of this neutron therapy trial, a decision later 
ratified by a specially-convened post-hoc DMC, the MRC required all of its RCTs to have a properly 
constituted DMC. 
In 1994, Spiegelhalter, Freedman and Parmar19 formalized Bayesian approaches to RCTs. Their 
Bayesian design and monitoring of the CHART trials included a description of how prior elicitation of 
clinicians’ opinion could be used to form “enthusiastic” and “sceptical” prior distributions20.  Neither 
CHART trial was closed to recruitment because, at each annual review, there was insufficient 
evidence to convert either the sceptics or the enthusiasts21. 
In 1999, on behalf of the Concorde, Alpha and Delta trials which randomized patients with 
asymptomatic HIV infection, Armitage (as DMC-chair) provided two insightful accounts of the DMC 
deliberations: the first  on interpreting  early data and trends in surrogate markers22 23 and the 
second as clear-cut differences in efficacy gradually emerged24.  See also Wittes25;  Ellenberg, 
Fleming and DeMets26  for an early practical textbook; and the injunction by Grant that DMCs must 
show strong resolve when large unanticipated differences are inconsistent with existing evidence 
from outside the RCT27, as Goodman later endorsed28. 
By 2005, the DAMOCLES Study Group, like the MRC, had recommended that every RCT should have 
a DMC29; and proposed a DMC charter to help them do their job well30. Of 20 questions that 
DAMOCLES posed to 25 regulatory or funding organizations, the two least likely to be answered 
were: on the training of DMC members (2 responses) and on decision-making within DMCs (3 
responses)29.  For further examples of DMC decision-making, see both the DAMOCLES Study Group29 
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itself (four examples) and Pocock’s editorial on when (not) to stop a clinical trial for benefit31, in 
which he discussed the merit of the Haybittle-Peto boundary which requires P < 0.001 as evidence to 
stop an RCT for efficacy.  
Tharmanathan et al.32 surveyed the use of interim data (with or without the mention of DMCs) by 
RCTs published in eight major journals: of 1772 RCTs published during 2000-2005, 470 (27%) 
reported the use of a DMC and a further 116 (7%) some form of interim analysis without explicit 
mention of a DMC; see also Sydes et al33 (for the DAMOCLES Study Group) who had contrasted DMC-
mentions in 1990 versus 2000. 
 
3. Back-story on the N-ALIVE pilot trial and Scotland’s National Naloxone Policy 
In late summer 2008, the MRC funded the pilot phase (that is: first 10% of randomizations) of the N-
ALIVE Trial4 5 6 which was to run in two prison jurisdictions (Scotland; England & Wales). Pro-rata in 
each jurisdiction, 2,800 consented eligible prisoners with a history of heroin-injection were to be 
randomized during incarceration to receive their assigned N-ALIVE pack on-release.  The trial was 
double-blind only until participants opened their assigned N-ALIVE pack immediately after release. 
The randomization ratio was 1:1. The N-ALIVE control packs contained no syringe and no naloxone. 
The naloxone packs contained a syringe of naloxone for “rescue” injection in the event that the 
participant overdosed on opioids1-3. The syringe contained 2mg of naloxone hydrochloride in 2ml of 
solution, for once-only intramuscular (IM) injection in the event of overdose.  During information 
and consent sessions while incarcerated, all N-ALIVE participants were advised on how to administer 
0.8mg of naloxone.   
The N-ALIVE pilot trial was designed to investigate the feasibility of randomized provision of NOR to 
eligible prisoners. The definitive N-ALIVE Trial would determine if NOR reduced participants’ drug-
related deaths (DRDs) by 30% in the first 4-weeks after release and by 20% in the subsequent 8 
weeks.4 5 6 Per 2,800 releases in the control group, we expected 14 DRDs in the first 4-weeks and 3.5 
DRDs in the subsequent 8 weeks4 5. 
As high risk of overdose death soon after prison-release applies per-release, re-randomization was 
permitted provided that at least six months had elapsed since the participant’s previous N-ALIVE 
release-date.  
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Contamination between randomized groups? 
In designing the N-ALIVE pilot trial, we had anticipated contamination between randomized groups 
of up to 20% because participants who had been randomized to NOR might administer their 
naloxone alternatively to an opioid-dependent  peer who had overdosed, some of whom  - unknown 
to us - might have been randomized to N-ALIVE’s control group.  
Specifically, if ex-prisoners’ 8 times higher DRD-risk in the first fortnight after release1 was on 
account of an 8 times higher overdose-risk then, assuming that  one of (say) three co-present 
injectors overdoses, there is an 80% chance that the person who overdosed was the recently-
released ex-prisoner to whom naloxone (if  also present) will therefore be administered. 
However, if injectors’ chance of opioid overdose is the same regardless of recent prison-release, so 
that recently-released ex-prisoners’ DRD-risk is due to an 8 times higher fatality-rate per opioid 
overdose, then each of the injector-triad above has the same chance of opioid-overdose. In this 
scenario, there is potentially a two-thirds chance that the ex-prisoner’s NOR is administered to 
another person so that contamination between N-ALIVE‘s randomized groups could be substantially 
higher than 20%: and especially so if, in addition, there is assortative mixing of recently-released 
prisoners. 
Contamination was assessed in the N-ALIVE pilot trial by asking participants who were returned to 
prison to complete a returned prisoner self-questionnaire (RPSQ). The questionnaire asked 
participants about overdose soon after release, and whether naloxone was administered before the 
arrival of an ambulance; and also about their presence when someone else overdosed, and whether 
naloxone was administered before the arrival of an ambulance5.  
Pre-emption of N-ALIVE’s randomization by National Naloxone Policies (NNPs) in Scotland and Wales 
The decision in spring 2010 by Scotland’s Minister for Safety and Communities to introduce 
Scotland’s NNP from January 2011 pre-empted N-ALIVE’s randomization in Scotland7 8.  
Scotland became the first country in the world to have a funded public health policy of NOR for at-
risk prisoners and THN for community-based opioid users. Wales34 35 followed Scotland’s lead later in 
2011, so that the N-ALIVE pilot trial could randomize in English prisons only. In May 2012 at 
Nottingham Prison, the N-ALIVE pilot trial randomized its first participants6. By the end of October 
2014, 1570 participants had been randomized by 16 participating prisons in England. 
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Before/after evaluation of Scotland’s National Naloxone Policy 
Scottish ministers made provision for 33,000 naloxone-kits (at £11 per kit) to be issued during 2011-
2013. In the event, the ministerial target took five years to be achieved and the cost per kit 
increased to £189.  
Based on Scotland’s 1970 ORDs in 2006-201036 versus around 1200 expected in 2011-20138, the 
before/after evaluation of Scotland’s NNP was designed to have 80% power to discern a 30% 
reduction in the proportion of prison-release ORDs (down from 10% to 7%) and a 20% reduction in 
the proportion of ORDs with a 4-week antecedent of prison-release and/or hospital-discharge (down 
from 20% to 16%).  
Scotland’s number of ORDs was not an effectiveness outcome for 2011-2013 because ORDs in 
Scotland (also in England and Wales9) had been on an age-related rising trajectory during the first 
decade of the 21st century8 12. Moreover, ORDs were susceptible to sharp changes in the illicit heroin 
market.  
 
4. Anticipatory elicitation  
On behalf of Scotland’s National Naloxone Advisory Group, the Information Services Division (ISD) in 
Scotland undertook the look-backs from Scotland’s ORDs to establish their 4-week antecedent of i) 
prison-release and ii) prison-release and/or hospital-discharge. Findings were reported as official 
statistics36. Prior to 28 October 201411, the baseline proportion of Scotland’s ORDs in 2006-10 with a 
4-week antecedent of prison-release and/or hospital-discharge had not been published; but was 
expected to be around 20%.  
Table 1 shows the published information at the end of August 201412 36 on NNP’s primary and 
secondary outcomes for the baseline period of 2006-2010; and for 2011-2013. With ministerial 
endorsement, Scotland had set regional targets for the community-issue of THN in 2013/14 so that 
Scotland’s issued naloxone-kits in 2013 would almost surely exceed those in 2012 (and did11).  
Please see Supplementary Material for the invitation and elicitation-briefing that was issued to 
three cadres of individuals from whom we wished to elicit prior opinion: a) some 30 statistician-
members of MRC Biostatistics Unit who attended a Workshop on Evidence Synthesis for Health in 
September 2014, b) four selected members of Scotland’s National Naloxone Advisory Group and c) 
five members of the N-ALIVE pilot Trial team (its principal investigators; AMM; and trial-statistician). 
Even for biostatisticians, elicitation of expert opinion on a joint outcome was tricky as their low 
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response-rate may indicate. The required joint outcome was: i) Scotland’s number of ORDs in 2013 
with a 4-week antecedent of prison-release ((X3 in Table 2) and ii) Scotland’s number of ORDs in 
2011-2013 with a 4-week antecedent of hospital-discharge but not prison-release (HD in Table 2). 
Responses were received as follows: a) 11, b) 4 and c) 4. One of the 19 respondents offered an 
opinion only on i). 
Table 2 shows the summed responses from the above three elicitation-sources. The attention of the 
N-ALIVE pilot trial’s TS-DMC was focused on the elicitation’s three (out of nine) top-belief cells which 
together accounted for 50% of assessors’ prior belief.  As we learned subsequently on 28 October 
2014, the actual outcomes were: i) 18 ORDs in 2013 with a 4-week antecedent of prison-release and 
ii) 181 ORDs in 2011-2013 with a 4-week antecedent of prison-release and/or hospital-discharge so 
that the number of ORDs in 2011-13 with a 4-week antecedent of hospital-discharge but not prison-
release equalled 181-76, or 1059 11. 
 
5. Deliberations and decisions by N-ALIVE’s Trial Steering -Data Monitoring Committee   
In this section, we sketch the rationale for and main business of the N-ALIVE pilot trial’s TS-DMC 
prior to October 2014. We then detail the TS-DMC’s deliberations in October and November 2014. 
The N-ALIVE pilot trial’s emerging data on ORDs (now maximally for 2,800 participants; versus 
56,000 required to demonstrate NOR’s a priori plausible effectiveness4 5 8) were highly unlikely to 
achieve a sufficient signal-noise ratio on effectiveness and so a joint TS-DMC had been appointed 
(which DA chaired). Membership included N-ALIVE’s three co-principal investigators (JS, MKBP, 
SMB). The TS-DMC’s independent chair and membership would, we hoped, form the nucleus of the 
main trial’s DMC.  
Prior to October 2014, the main business of the N-ALIVE pilot trial’s TS-DMC had been to support the 
recruitment of a sufficient number of prisons in England; to deliberate on reasons for fewer 
prisoners with a history of heroin injection being identified by our prison-based N-ALIVE workers 
than anticipated by the number of prisoners engaged in drug treatment in 2005/066; and to engage 
governors in promoting their security staff’s acceptance that our assigned N-ALIVE packs should be 
held with the prisoner’s valuables5 6. 
Our TS-DMC members had not expected to confront critical ethical decisions on whether to cease 
randomization in the N-ALIVE pilot trial. However, from the outset, their responsibilities did include 
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the review of external evidence and recommending whether the pilot trial should continue to the N-
ALIVE main trial.  
The TS-DMC did not take formal action on NNP’s interim data for 2011+2012 on prison-release 
ORDs, see Table 1, which had decreased significantly (p < 0.01) from 9.8% (193/1970) in 2006-2010 
to 7.0% (58/829) in 2011+2012 as the wide confidence interval and NNP’s before/after design 
warranted only a watching brief. Moreover, by the end of October 2013, the N-ALIVE pilot trial had 
received fewer than 70 of its own RPSQs. 
In October 2014, however, TS-DMC members were faced by external data which required tense and 
careful deliberation. Prior elicitation of expert opinion had served to sensitize members to the sorts 
of decision that might have to be made. The elicitation results were considered by N-ALIVE’s TS-DMC 
at its meeting on 20 October 2014, eight days ahead of ISD’s official statistics release11. The TS-DMC 
was also made aware of commissioners’ plans for prisons in the North West region of England to 
issue NOR to eligible prisoners; and that, if funding for the N-ALIVE pilot trial was not to be extended 
beyond March 2015, randomizations would have to cease by the end of December 2014 to allow 
time for 12-weeks’ follow-up and an orderly closure of the N-ALIVE sites. 
The TS-DMC minutes recorded that, following the release of the third year of results on Scotland’s 
NNP11 on 28 October 2014, a teleconference would be organized to decide the course of action for 
N-ALIVE. In practice, the TS-DMC chair asked that the TS-DMC’s initial deliberations be conducted by 
email as an analytical summary of Scotland’s 3-year results for 2011-2013 had to be prepared. Also, 
in view of the late registration of coroner-referred deaths in England and Wales, information on 
ORDs in Wales and England by death-year, rather than by the year of death-registration, were 
needed to set Scotland’s ORDs in context9 37 38.   
As Scotland’s 3-year results coincided with one of the three cells in Table 2 wherein lay 50% of the 
prior belief, the elicitation exercise had served mainly as reassurance that prior beliefs and 
realization were not at odds. There was no added scepticism19-21 to be weighed in the balance. 
Deliberations: 28 October to 18 November 2014 
Key considerations were:  
a) N-ALIVE pilot trial’s undertaking to participants and to the Research Ethics Committee that they 
would be notified immediately if the principal investigators had reason to believe that the N-ALIVE 
main trial could not go ahead as planned;  
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b) N-ALIVE pilot trial’s own data from RPSQs, together with Scotland’s information from re-supplies  
showed that NOR was administered to another: self in the ratio 15:5 and 21:12 (that is: 36:17 or 
2:1), giving an upper 99% confidence limit of 50% for NOR’s administration to the recently-released 
prisoner as assigned; 
c) effect-size for Scotland’s primary outcome of prison-release ORDs (p < 0.001)31 was consistent 
with the a priori targets adopted by the N-ALIVE main trial but Scotland’s recently-released prisoners 
potentially benefitted from community-issued THN  as well as from NOR; 
d) association is not causation, and so Scotland’s before/after comparison needed to be appraised in 
the light of Hill’s criteria on causality9 39;  
e) Scotland’s NNP outcomes were published annually as official statistics but a formally peer-
reviewed report on NNP’s outcomes in 2011-13 versus 2006-109 was lacking;  
f) as Europe’s largest prison-based randomized controlled trial (RCT)6, if the N-ALIVE pilot trial 
ceased randomizing, damage could be done internationally to the case for prison-based RCTs;  
g) as the N-ALIVE trial’s participants were held in prison custody, the highest ethical standards would 
be maintained by TS-DMC on their behalf; 
h) the likely consequence in England - if the N-ALIVE pilot trial ceased  randomizing eligible prisoners  
in the ratio 1:1 between NOR and control - was that no eligible prisoner in England would receive 
NOR rather than, as now,  half of those who participated from N-ALIVE prisons; 
i) hence, continued prison-based randomization would be ethical on the basis that NOR was a 
rationed or restricted resource; 
j) upon release, N-ALIVE’s participants are as free as any other citizen is to obtain THN by 
prescription, for example by requesting it from their general practitioner; 
k) finally, N-ALIVE’s principal investigators were scientifically-bound to consider and promote 
randomized alternatives, such as randomized step-wedge designs, to ensure that as robust evidence 
as possible could be got40 41 from the instigation of regional NNPs in England. 
Considerations c) to e) were addressed by SMB’s drafting for consideration by TS-DMC of a 3-year 
report on Scotland’s NNP outcomes. This report, which included the application of Hill’s criteria on 
causality39, formed the basis of a co-authored, peer-reviewed subsequent publication in Addiction9. 
Considerations f) to k) were addressed by JS’s drafting of an ethical and wider scientific counter-case 
for continued randomization. 
 10 
 
Considerations f) and g) were balanced by considerations i) and j). The fairness of continued 
randomization when a resource such as NOR is scarce or restricted is a strong argument, both 
scientifically and ethically.  TS-DMC’s duty is, however, primarily to participants in the trial which the 
TS-DMC was convened to oversee29. 
Considerations h) and k) were met by the N-ALIVE co-principal investigators’ letter to England’s Chief 
Medical Officer to appraise her of the Scottish data, the decisions to be taken in respect of the N-
ALIVE pilot trial and the likely cost-effectiveness of a NNP in England which should aim to issue 9,000 
to 20,000 naloxone-kits per annum8, including NOR for eligible prisoners as in Scotland9 42 and 
Wales35.  
Decisions: 18 November to 1 December 2014 
According to its charter6, the N-ALIVE pilot trial’s TS-DMC was quorate at its meeting on 18 
November 2014 because two independent members (DA and SW) were present in addition to the 
three principal investigators. But, because the TS-DMC was considering a major action, the TS-DMC 
chair needed to communicate with the absent members (JP and JRR) as soon after the meeting as 
possible to check if they were in agreement. If not, a further teleconference should be arranged with 
the full TS-DMC.  
Considerations a) and b) were deciding factors: we estimated that at least half the administrations of 
NOR  in the N-ALIVE main trial would be to some-one other than the ex-prisoner for whom NOR had 
been prescribed. Even without NOR-administered contamination of the N-ALIVE control group, the 
number to be randomized in the N-ALIVE main trial would be excessive (over 150,000). Worse, 
substantial contamination, in excess of 20%, could not be ruled out and so the main trial could not 
go ahead. 
The N-ALIVE pilot trial’s TS-DMC decided, on the basis of a) and b), that randomization should cease 
in the N-ALIVE pilot trial on 8 December 2014. Because of the strength of the evidence from 
Scotland’s NNP (since peer-reviewed9) and the WHO Guidelines published on 5th November 201440 
41, the TS-DMC recommended to local PIs that, once randomization ceased, all randomized 
participants who remained in prison should be offered NOR (ie those who had been allocated to 
control as well as those assigned to NOR). Submission to the Research Ethics Committee was made 
on 21 November 2014, which notified its approval on 1 December 2014 of the TS-DMC’s 
recommendations and N-ALIVE’s updated information for participants on the basis for its decisions 
(see http://www.ctu.mrc.ac.uk/our_research/research_areas/other_conditions/studies/n_alive/). 
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The TS-DMC’s recommendations were also endorsed by N-ALIVE’s prison-based investigators who 
put them into force. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The elicitation of expert opinion on the Scottish NNP’s likely outcomes during 2011-13, when they 
would be available anyway in less than two weeks, set the scene for the TS-DMC’s deliberations but 
was not otherwise influential, because prior beliefs and realization were consistent; not 
contradictory.  
Time for reflection and appraisal of causality were necessary for TS-DMC’s decisions to have been 
reached unanimously on what to do in respect of serving prisoners who had been randomized to the 
control group.  
The critical decision – that an individually-randomized controlled trial of naloxone-on-release had 
been shown to be the wrong design because at most half the administrations of NOR were to the ex-
prisoner as assigned – was more easily made. The elicitation of expert opinion had no bearing on this 
decision, for which the dominant consideration was consistency of another: self ratio between N-
ALIVE’s RPSQs and Scotland’s information from NOR re-supplies. [3,751 words] 
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Table 1: Published information by end August 20149 10 on the primary and 
secondary outcomes for Scotland’s National Naloxone Policy (NNP): baseline 
period of 2006-2010 versus 2011-2013. 
 
Before/after evaluation of Scotland’s National Naloxone Policy  
& set-up for ELICITATION of unknown counts X3 and HD where 
 
X3 is the number of Scotland’s 383 ORDs in 2013 with 4-week antecedent of prison-release and  
HD is the number of Scotland’s 1212 ORDs in 2011-213 with 4-week antecedent of hospital-
discharge but not prison-release. 
 
PERIOD Naloxone-kits 
issued in Scotland 
(including by prisons) 
Percentage of Scotland’s opioid-related deaths (ORDs) with  
 4-week antecedent of: 
Prison-release 
PRIMARY OUTCOME 
Prison-release and/or hospital-discharge 
SECONDARY OUTCOME 
2006-10: Baseline 193/1970: 9.8% NK /1970: ~ 20% 
2011 2 487  (   570)   36/  430: 8.4% NK /   430 
2012 3 878  (   725)   22/  399: 5.5% NK/   399 
2013 NK       (    NK)    X3/  383:  NK/   383 
2011-13: NNP’s first three years {58 + X3}/1212 {58 + X3 + HD}/1212 
NK = not known 
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Table 2: Summation of responses across three elicitation-sources 
 
Elicited peer opinion on both X3 and HD, where: 
X3 /383 ORDs in 2013 with a 4-week antecedent of prison-release in 2013  
& 
{58 + X3 + HD}/1212 ORDs in 2011-2013 with a 4-week antecedent of prison-release and/or hospital-
discharge. 
 
PRIOR 
BELIEFS:  
1800 BETS 
Placed on 
HD ;  
1900 BETS 
Placed on 
X3 
HD 
 
 
 
< 75 75 - 79 80 –84 85- 89 90- 94 95–104  >104 
 
Marginal 
% 
Distributions 
448/1800 769/1800 583/1800 
 
25% 
 
43% 
 
32% 
 < 22 
 
873/1900 
 
46% 
11% 
 
201/1800 
17% 
 
301/1800 
15% 
 
271/1800 
22 -28 
 
683/1900 
 
36% 
  8% 
 
144/1800 
18% 
 
323/1800 
 12% 
 
216/1800 
> 28 
 
344/1900 
 
18% 
  6% 
 
103/1800 
  8% 
 
145/1800 
  5% 
 
96/1800 
 
Disclosed as official statistics on 28 October 2014, the realizations were:  X3 = 18 and HD = 105.  
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Supplementary Material 
 
Elicitation of prior opinion about Scotland’s 3-year results on 28 October 
2014 from its National Naloxone Policy. 
 
1. Attached is  a briefing  in which the results for Scotland's primary outcome for 2011+2012 
are summarized where:  
 
2. Primary  outcome:  % opiate-related deaths (ORDs) with a 4-week antecedent of prison-
release; primary outcome in the 5-year baseline period was 10% (193 of 1970 ORDs). 
 
Secondary outcome:  % opiate-related deaths (ORDs) with a 4-week antecedent of prison-
release or hospital-discharge.  
 
PLEASE NOTE: The numerator for secondary outcome in 2006-2010 has not been disclosed 
but is believed to be around 20% of Scotland's 1970 ORDs in 2006-2010.  
 
3.  We can expect that the effectiveness of NNP should accelerate from 2011 thro’ 2012 thro’ 
2013 because some of the naloxone-kits issued in 2011 will still be available for use in 
subsequent years;  similarly for 2012-issued naloxone-kits; and for the 2013-issue  . . .   
 
PLEASE NOTE: More or less sophisticated simulation studies can be run to estimate the 
extent of this acceleration, one version of which is 1:3:4 from 2011 thro’ 2013.   
 
4. Although a similar number of naloxone-kits was issued in each of the policy’s first two 
financial years 2011/2012 and 2012/2013 (about 3,600 each), the roll-out in the calendar 
year of 2011 had a slow start, with very limited issue in the first quarter of 2011.  
 
5. Many more naloxone-kits should have been issued in 2013/14 (approximately 5,000) 
because targets were set for Scotland's community-based issue of THN-kits.  
 
6. Target for prisons' issue of NOR-kits did not apply until 2014/15.  
 
7. Unlike prisons, Scotland's hospitals are not specifically tasked to issue THN-kits to opiate-
dependent patients whom they discharge: despite their 4-week ORD-risk being high, albeit 
only half the risk for similar clients in the 4-weeks after prison-release.  
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PLEASE PLACE YOUR BETS! 
 
With the above information in mind, please place 100 bets in the 21-cell grid below for 
the joint-outcomes of X3 & HD, where 
 X3 = primary outcome's numerator in 2013 when the denominator was 383 ORDs  
& where 
58 + X3 + HD= numerator for secondary outcome for 2011+2012+2013, for which the KNOWN 
denominator is 430+399+383 = 1212 ORDs for the calendar years of 2011+2012+2013. 
 
PRIOR 
BELIEF: 
100 BETS 
HD    
< 75 
75 – 79 80 - 84 85- 89 90- 94 95– 104 HD  
>104 
X3     < 22  
 
 
      
22 -28  
 
 
      
> 28  
 
 
      
 
Please also complete: 
Age-group of respondent:  1 = 20-29; 2 = 30-39; 3 = 40-49; 4 = 50+ years    [     ] 
 
 
